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Sharenting and the (Potential) Right to Be Forgotten
KELTIE HALEY*
INTRODUCTION
Social networking sites—like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube—provide
parents with the ability to instantly share information about their children with family
and friends across the globe. While most parents are content sharing birthday pictures
and humorous anecdotes about their toddlers with a select group of Facebook friends,
other parents have capitalized (socially and monetarily) on disclosing information
about their children to strangers on the internet.1 Social media accounts dedicated to
images, videos, and information about the accountholder’s children are often
remarkably successful in terms of follower or subscriber count. For example, The
Shaytards, a YouTube channel that posts multiple video blogs (vlogs) per week—
documenting everything from bicycle rides and haircuts to the birth of a child—has
amassed over five million subscribers in the span of ten years.2 This type of extreme
internet activity undoubtedly contributes to these children’s digital footprints
(traceable digital activity), often without their explicit consent, and can pose a serious
privacy concern for them later in life.3 Yet, it is not just “internet famous” children
whose privacy is at risk, as the average parent generally lacks the experience or
expertise to protect their children from the risks associated with online information
sharing.4
Sharenting is defined as a parent’s use of social media to discuss their children’s
lives by sharing text posts, photographs, and videos that convey personal information
about their children.5 For many parents, sharenting provides an opportunity to

* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. B.S.P.A. & B.A.,
2017, Indiana University. A special thanks to Professor Roger J.R. Levesque for his
constructive feedback on early drafts of my Note, and to the members of Indiana Law Journal
for their hard work throughout the publication process.
1. See Emine Saner, The “Sharent’ Trap – Should You Ever Put Your Children on Social
Media?, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle
/2018/may/24/sharent-trap-should-parents-put-their-children-on-social-media-instagram
[https://perma.cc/8NXH-DRG4]; Amelia Tait, Is It Safe to Turn Your Children into YouTube
Stars?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2015, 4:24 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology
/2015/sep/16/youtube-stars-vlogging-child-safety-sacconejolys-katie-and-baby
[https://perma.cc/PH62-KE6S].
2. Shaytards, Who Are the Shaytards?, YOUTUBE (2013), https://www.youtube.com/user
/SHAYTARDS/featured
[https://perma.cc/8N97-88FZ];
see
also
Food
Baby
(@FoodbabyNY), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/foodbabyny [https://perma.cc
/8SBT-LUGU] (posting multiple images a day of the accountholder’s children with food from
various New York City restaurants and gaining 308 thousand followers).
3. GWENN SCHURGIN O’KEEFFE & KATHLEEN CLARKE-PEARSON, AM. ACAD.
PEDIATRICS, CLINICAL REPORT—THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS,
AND FAMILIES 802 (2011).
4. Bahareh Ebadifar Keith & Stacey Steinberg, Parental Sharing on the Internet: Child
Privacy in the Age of Social Media and the Pediatrician’s Role, 171 JAMA PEDIATRICS 413,
413 (2017).
5. See Grace Yiseul Choi & Jennifer Lewallen, “Say Instagram, Kids!”: Examining
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connect with friends and family, seek out their support, and experience validation for
their parenting decisions, which leads to a greater sense of satisfaction in their role
as parents.6 Further, the decision to share information about their children is linked
to a parent’s right to direct the upbringing of their children, which is generally
recognized as a fundamental liberty interest in American jurisprudence.7 However,
there are significant harms from both a developmental and legal perspective
associated with parents sharing too much information, or sharing inappropriate or
embarrassing information and images, on social media sites.8 Parental oversharing
can interfere with a child’s development of their sense of identity and autonomy9 and
can put a child at risk for identity theft, bullying by peers and adults (both online and
offline), and potential college and job rejections later in life.10 In some legal contexts,
minors have an—albeit limited—right to privacy outside of the context of the
familial unit,11 and I argue that this right should be extended to the online setting due
to the long-lasting implications of oversharing personal information on the internet.
Part I of this Note serves as an evaluation of parental use of social media and
further seeks to draw attention to the social and developmental impact parental
oversharing can have on children. Part II examines the tension between parents’
constitutional rights to direct the upbringing of their children, as well as their First
Amendment interest in online expression, and their children’s interest in personal
data security and privacy. Part III provides an overview of the European Union’s
right to be forgotten framework in the sharenting context and considers the
plausibility of implementing such a framework in the United States. Given the
competing constitutional interests at stake, I argue that a balanced-rights approach
should be taken to empower minors to control what personal information can be
permanently disclosed about them, while also preventing infringement on the rights
of parents to express their views on parenting and direct the upbringing of their
children.12 The right to be forgotten framework—adopted from the European Court
of Justice’s landmark ruling in Google Spain v. Costeja13 and codified in the General

Sharenting and Children’s Digital Representations on Instagram, 29 HOW. J. COMM. 144, 145
(2018); Holly Kathleen Hall, Oversharenting: Is It Really Your Story to Tell?, 33 J. MARSHALL
J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 121, 121–23 (2018); Stacey B. Steinberg, Sharenting: Children’s
Privacy in the Age of Social Media, 66 EMORY L.J. 839, 842 (2017).
6. See Claire Bessant, Sharenting: Balancing the Conflicting Rights of Parents and
Children, 23 J. COMPUTER, MEDIA & TELECOMM. L. 7, 8 (2018); Steinberg, supra note 5,
at 846.
7. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
8. See Bessant, supra note 6, at 14; Carol Moser, Tianying Chen & Sarita Y.
Schoenebeck, Parents’ and Children’s Preferences About Parents Sharing About Children on
Social Media, CHI 2017, May 2017, at 5221, 5221; Kirsten Weir, Parents: Watch Those Social
Media Posts, 48 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., JULY/AUG. 2017, at 28, 28.
9. Benjamin Shmueli & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Privacy for Children, 42 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 759, 772 (2011).
10. Keith & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 413–14; Steinberg, supra note 5, at 849, 854–55.
11. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647–48 (1979).
12. Steinberg, supra note 5, at 876–77.
13. Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD),
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Data Protection Regulation as the right to erasure14—would be an effective means of
balancing these competing interests, as parents would still have the ability to disclose
information about their children and family life on social media sites, while children
would have the option to request that search engines remove links to specific pages
when the child’s name is searched.15
I. UNDERSTANDING PARENTAL USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE RAMIFICATIONS OF
SHARENTING
Studies on parental use of and behavior on social networking sites indicate that a
majority of parents with minor children use some form of social media and
experience positive benefits from using these sites, including a better connection with
family and friends, access to advice, and validation of their parenting choices.16 Yet,
this practice of parental sharing on social media sites can negatively impact their
children by putting them at risk for serious threats, like identity fraud, exploitation,
loss of educational and employment prospects, and developmental problems.
A. Parental Use of Social Media and Understanding Sharenting
Until recently, studies on children and online privacy tended to focus on concerns
about children and teens publishing too much (or inappropriate) information about
themselves online rather than parents’ use of social media and their risk of
oversharing information about their children online.17 Expert opinions generally
emphasize providing guidance to parents for understanding their children’s online
behavior and how best to monitor their children’s use of social media.18 Yet, based
on the high reported incidence of parental oversharing—with 74% of parents in one
study reporting that they know of at least one other parent who has shared too much
information about a child on social media19—and the fact that 92% of all U.S. twoyear-olds have an online presence,20 there is a real risk that parents lack adequate
expertise with social media and privacy to protect their children from the harms
associated with online information sharing.21

2014 E.C.R 317.
14. Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119).
15. Giancarlo F. Frosio, The Right to Be Forgotten: Much Ado About Nothing, 15 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 307, 326–27 (2017).
16. See, e.g., Bessant, supra note 6, at 8; C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital, Parents on Social
Media: Likes and Dislikes of Sharenting, 23 MOTT NAT’L POLL ON CHILD. HEALTH, Mar. 16,
2015, at 1.
17. Charlotte Chalklen & Heather Anderson, Mothering on Facebook: Exploring the
Privacy/Openness Paradox, SOC. MEDIA & SOC’Y, May 2017, at 1, 1–2.
18. Keith & Steinberg, supra note 4.
19. C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital, supra note 16, at 1.
20. Steinberg, supra note 5, at 849.
21. See Keith & Steinberg, supra note 4 (highlighting a number of harms associated with
parental sharing that parents may not be aware of, including: identity theft, reposting of images
on predatory sites, and sharing psychosocial or embarrassing information that should remain
private).
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A significant majority of parents of minor children indicate participation on at
least one social media site, online forum, or blog.22 A 2014 study by C.S. Mott
Children’s Hospital National Poll on Children’s Health indicates that 84% of mothers
and 70% of fathers of children under the age of four use some form of social media,
forum, or blog.23 Of parents polled, 56% percent of mothers and 34% of fathers
reported discussing child health and other parenting topics on social media.24 Parents
reported that social media is helpful to building community and making them feel
like they are not alone (72%), for learning what not to do as a parent (70%), and for
getting advice from more experienced parents (67%).25 Undoubtedly, social media
use plays a positive role in many parents’ lives, as it allows parents to connect with
family and friends, seek support for difficult parenting decisions, and avoid feelings
of isolation.26 Social media also provides a means for parents to draw attention to
medical and social issues impacting children and allows parents of children with
disabilities and terminal illnesses to develop a sense of solidarity and community in
what can be a very isolating parental role.27 Further, social media use can enhance
feelings of self-worth and satisfaction, as parents report greater satisfaction in their
parenting roles if their friends and family are more likely to comment on photographs
of their children that they post online.28
Yet, parents also appear to recognize that sharenting can be problematic, with
74% of parents knowing another parent who has shared too much information about
their children online—56% recognizing embarrassing information being shared,
51% recognizing personal information that could identify a child’s location, and 27%
recognizing inappropriate photos of a child being shared.29 Parents also indicate a
concern about their own social media use and its implications for their children’s
safety and privacy. Of the parents surveyed in the C.S. Mott study, 68% expressed
concern that someone could find out private information about their child, 67% were
concerned that someone would share a picture of their child on another social media
page or website, and 52% expressed concern that their child might be upset with, or
embarrassed by, what they posted on social media as the child reaches adolescence.30
A study of Australian mothers of children under the age of five revealed that 78% of
those surveyed agreed that privacy issues on Facebook are of concern.31 These
mothers indicated a number of serious concerns including: concerns about personal
data being collected and used for marketing purposes; general unease about
contributing to their children’s digital footprints; confusion about the use of privacy

22. See C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital, supra note 16; Keith & Steinberg, supra note 4
(citing a Pew study that indicates that seventy-five percent of parents with minor children use
some form of social media, including Facebook, Pinterest, LinkedIn, Instagram, and Twitter).
23. C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital, supra note 16.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Bessant, supra note 6, at 8; Keith & Steinberg, supra note 4; Steinberg, supra note 5,
at 846.
27. See Bessant, supra note 6, at 8; Keith & Steinberg, supra note 4.
28. See Keith & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 8.
29. C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital, supra note 16.
30. Id.
31. Chalklen & Anderson, supra note 17, at 5.
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settings; the effectiveness of privacy settings; and the risk of stalking, bullying, or
information collected online being used against them.32 However, despite these
privacy concerns, 61% of the surveyed mothers listed posting pictures or comments
about their children as their most frequent activity on Facebook.33
Given the acknowledgement of privacy concerns by parents, it seems surprising
that a majority of parents happily continue to post information about their children
on social media sites. However, studies on self-disclosure and social media indicate
that this is a common phenomenon.34 Chalklen and Anderson refer to this behavior
as a privacy paradox: social media users are willing to disclose personal information
on social networking sites even though they express concerns over privacy issues on
the same sites.35 According to Tsay-Vogel, Shanahan, and Signorielli, “social media
users are consistently exposed to mediated forms of self-disclosure, and this
prevailing theme of personal information exchange can have a cumulative impact on
one’s social reality, particularly perceptions related to the domain of privacy.”36 This
relationship between social media usage and relaxed perceptions and attitudes about
privacy leads to greater self-disclosure of personal information online, which
includes the disclosure of information about the user’s family and children.37 Further,
feelings of validation as a result of positive engagement from friends and family on
social media create a positive feedback loop and encourage parents to share more
information about their children.38
B. Consequences and Risks of Sharenting for Children
Parental oversharing on social media sites can pose significant (immediate and
long-term) threats to children’s legal rights. Children and adolescents are particularly
vulnerable targets for identity fraud39 and digital kidnapping—the practice of posing
as someone else by reposting an individual’s images on other social media pages.40
By sharing posts that include a child’s name, birthday, or home address, parents can
make it easier for fraudsters to steal their children’s identity. Even if parents limit
who can access their posts and images using privacy settings on social media sites,

32. Id. at 5–6.
33. Id. at 7.
34. See Mina Tsay-Vogel, James Shanahan & Nancy Signorielli, Social Media
Cultivating Perceptions of Privacy: A 5-Year Analysis of Privacy Attitudes and SelfDisclosure Behaviors Among Facebook Users, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 141, 142 (2018)
(studying self-disclosure—a “communication behavior in which an individual consciously
makes [themselves] known to others” through the disclosure of personal information).
35. Chalklen & Anderson, supra note 17, at 2.
36. Tsay-Vogel, Shanahan & Signorielli, supra note 34, at 143.
37. See id. at 154 (“The influx of personal information in the virtual environment appears
to cultivate perceptions of privacy such that users are less concerned about privacy risks and
pay less attention to privacy safeguards.”).
38. Steinberg, supra note 5, at 846.
39. Keith & Steinberg, supra note 4; Milda Macenaite, From Universal Towards ChildSpecific Protection of the Right to Privacy Online: Dilemmas in the EU General Data
Protection Regulation, 19 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 765, 765 (2017); O’KEEFFE & CLARKEPEARSON, supra note 3, at 802.
40. Steinberg, supra note 5, at 854.
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there is still a risk that images of their children can be saved and later reposted on an
unsecured page.41 Although alteration of images does occur, pictures of children in
any state of undress (such as images of potty training and bath time) are popular
targets for use on predatory websites.42 Personal information about a child’s current
or frequent location (identified by tagging photos with locations or “checking in” on
Facebook) can put children at risk for violent crimes and kidnappings, which is
particularly concerning given that 76% of kidnappings and 90% of violent crimes
against minors are perpetrated by family members or acquaintances.43
In the long term, parents can negatively impact their children’s ability to receive
college and job acceptances through their participatory surveillance of their children,
which is then made accessible to “dataveillance” firms that collect information and
create profiles of people for economic incentives.44 The information collected by
dataveillance firms is then sold to advertisers, employment agencies, and college
admissions offices (among others).45 This means that a child’s opportunities for
employment and education are shaped by forms of social sorting determined by
dataveillance and algorithms and based on personal information that they did not
consent to making available.46
Sharenting can also pose developmental risks to children, as it impacts the
development of self-identity, autonomy, and trust and can inform interactions with
their peers. By sharing information that should remain private, or by sharing
revealing or embarrassing information about a child, parents are putting their
children at risk for bullying by their peers, as well as by strangers.47 The threat of
embarrassment and bullying could severely impact a child’s development as they
learn to navigate the world as an autonomous individual. Adults with cognitive and
physical disabilities have expressed serious concern about parents discussing their
children’s disabilities online and argue that this information is extremely personal
and often embarrassing, which could impact the child’s self-identity and how their
peers interact with the disabled child.48 Both legal and social science scholars
recognize children’s need for privacy in order to develop their sense of independence,
self-reliance, and individuality.49
Further, as children near adolescence, many begin to find their parents’ intimate
surveillance and information sharing on social media intrusive.50 A study on parents’

41. Id. at 850.
42. Keith & Steinberg, supra note 4; Steinberg, supra note 5, at 847.
43. Steinberg, supra note 5, at 848–49.
44. Deborah Lupton & Ben Williamson, The Datafied Child: The Dataveillance of
Children and Implications for Their Rights, 19 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 780, 782 (2017) (defining
social or participatory surveillance as voluntary participation in social media through
uploading images and videos to social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube,
which thereby invites other social media users to surveil or watch).
45. Steinberg, supra note 5, at 849.
46. Lupton & Williamson, supra note 44, at 787.
47. Steinberg, supra note 5, at 854–55; see also Keith & Steinberg, supra note 4 (noting
that embarrassing or revealing information shared by parents can be misused by others).
48. Bessant, supra note 6, at 8.
49. Shmueli & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 9, at 772–76.
50. Lupton & Williamson, supra note 44, at 788; see also Tara Haelle, Do Parents Invade
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and children’s preferences about parents sharing information about their children on
social media found that children are averse to parents sharing information that is
perceived to be embarrassing (such as nude baby pictures or unflattering images),
information that discloses the child’s bad behavior, and information that is overly
revealing or intrusive (such as information about a child’s friends or dating life) on
social media.51 However, children generally view positive content about their
accomplishments, happy family moments, and flattering photographs as acceptable
for parents to post on social media.52 Privacy is also an essential component of
forming trust and respect in a relationship, which is integral to a healthy parent-child
relationship.53 This is especially “relevant to parents’ respect for their children’s
privacy,”54 as parents’ oversharing about their children on social media (without the
child’s consent) can limit a child’s ability to maintain a trusting relationship with
their parent.55
Parents appear to be aware of the risks associated with online disclosure of
information about their children but continue to post information about their children
at relatively high rates,56 which indicates a need for external support for children to
remove content posted by their parents.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TENSION
The U.S. Supreme Court has historically held parental rights—specifically the
right to direct the upbringing of one’s child—as among the oldest and most
fundamental of the rights afforded by the Constitution.57 The Court’s general
restraint in limiting parental rights arises from the U.S. societal assumption that
parents have their children’s best interest in mind and will do what is in their
children’s best interest.58 Furthermore, the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom
of expression presumably includes a parent’s freedom to disseminate information
about their children on social networking sites.59 Yet, the Supreme Court has held

Children’s Privacy When They Post Photos Online?, NPR (Oct. 28, 2016, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/10/28/499595298/do-parents-invadechildrens-privacy-when-they-post-photos-online [https://perma.cc/GX6T-WPUV].
51. Moser, Chen & Schoenebeck, supra note 8, at 5224 (“Many examples of content that
children do not want parents sharing online were described in terms of photography, for
example ‘embarrassing photos’, [sic] ‘ugly pics,’ ‘baby photos’, [sic] or ‘[p]hotos that can
expose intimate life.’”).
52. Id.
53. Id. (recommending that parents take a permission-seeking approach with their
children when posting potentially personal information or images); Shmueli & Blecher-Prigat,
supra note 9, at 788–89.
54. Shmueli & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 9, at 789.
55. Id.
56. Chalklen & Anderson, supra note 17, at 7–8.
57. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
58. Keith & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 414.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
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that parental authority is not absolute and can be restricted if doing so will protect
the welfare interests of the child and the parent’s actions are at odds with the child’s
welfare interest.60 Additionally, the Court has recognized the right to privacy in the
penumbra of the Bill of Rights61 and has held that—in certain contexts—children
possess rights outside of the rights associated with their parents.62 In the context of
sharenting, there is a clear tension between parents’ rights to direct the upbringing of
their children, as well as their First Amendment interest in online expression, and
children’s plausible right to privacy.
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence and Parental Rights
In her majority opinion in Troxel v. Granville, Justice O’Connor wrote that “the
interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme] Court.”63
Indeed, the Court has long held out parental rights as among the fundamental liberties
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.64 In Meyer v.
Nebraska, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Nebraska state statute that
prohibited the educational instruction of grade school children in any language other
than English.65 While refusing to precisely define the liberty interests guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court concluded that
among those freedoms is the right to “establish a home and bring up children . . . and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”66 Therefore, the Court held that while
the State can pass laws to improve the quality of its citizens, the right to direct the
education of one’s children in a language other than English is a fundamental right
which necessitates respect by the State.67 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme
Court evaluated an Oregon statute that required children between the ages of eight
and sixteen to receive an education in the public school setting, with the manifest
purpose of the statute being to compel attendance at public schools for children who
had not yet completed the eighth grade.68 In following the doctrine established in
Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court held that the Oregon statute unreasonably interfered
with parents’ liberty to direct the upbringing and education of their children.69
Further, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the

60. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
61. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
62. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647–48 (1979); see also Jessica Ronay, Adults Post
the Darndest Things: [CTRL + SHIFT] Freedom of Speech to [ESC] our Past, 46 U. TOL. L.
REV. 73, 75–76 (2014) (noting that “[s]peech that is otherwise fully protected by the First
Amendment may be restricted to protect children”).
63. 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.”).
65. 262 U.S. 390, 396–98 (1923).
66. Id. at 399.
67. Id. at 401.
68. 268 U.S. 510, 530–31 (1925).
69. Id. at 534–35.
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State” and parents have both a right and a duty to prepare their children for a
successful life.70 In Troxel v. Granville, the Court considered the constitutionality of
a Washington statute that permitted any person to have visitation rights when
“visitation may serve the best interest of the child.”71 Again, the Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State from infringing
on the fundamental rights of parents solely because a judge believes a “better”
decision could be made.72
The First Amendment’s guarantees of the right to free expression and the right to
free exercise of religion play a significant role in the promotion of parental rights.73
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law in relation to the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.74 The Court found that the compulsory schoolattendance law unconstitutionally interfered with the respondents’ religious liberties
to direct the upbringing of their children, which the Court deemed as “established
beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”75 Here, the Court recognized the
respondents’ sincere belief in the Amish faith and belief that traditional secondary
education substantially interferes with the religious development of Amish children
and their continued integration into the Amish community.76 Accordingly, the First
Amendment’s guarantee of a right to free speech likely includes protections of a
parent’s right to share information about their children on social media.77 However,
the right to free speech is not absolute, particularly in the context of speech that could
be harmful to children.78
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence, Federal Law, and Children’s Rights
While somewhat limited in scope, a number of Supreme Court decisions indicate
that children have rights that exist outside of the rights of their parents and the family.
In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court considered whether Massachusetts’s child
labor laws violated the appellant’s First Amendment right to free exercise of religion
and Fourteenth Amendment due process right to direct the upbringing of her ward.79
While acknowledging the important and fundamental role that parents play in raising

70. Id. at 535.
71. 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000).
72. Id. at 72–73.
73. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”).
74. 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
75. Id. at 232, 234.
76. Id. at 216–18.
77. See generally Trevor Puetz, Facebook: The New Town Square, 44 SW. L. REV. 385,
385 (2014) (describing social networking sites as key sites for self-expression that are
“dependent upon freedom of speech”).
78. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (finding that the First
Amendment’s right to free speech did not protect against bans on the sale of material depicting
children engaging in sexual activity, even if the material itself is not obscene); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (finding that the First Amendment permits the regulation of
the sale of material that may be harmful to minors, even if the material itself is not obscene).
79. 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944).
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their children, the Court reasoned that the family is not beyond regulation if that
regulation is in the public interest.80 The Court held that the State’s child labor laws
do not violate either the First or Fourteenth Amendment, stating that “[p]arents may
be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached
the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.”81
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court concluded that if the State requires a pregnant minor
to obtain one or both parents’ consent to receive an abortion, the State must also
provide an alternative means of authorization for the procedure.82 Here, the Court
recognized the potential conflict of interests between a child and her parents,
particularly in settings where the parents have strong objections to abortion and the
child is vulnerable to her parents’ efforts to obstruct her access to an abortion or the
courts.83
The Supreme Court has recognized the existence of a right to privacy in the
penumbras of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights.84 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the
Court reasoned that the right to privacy has roots preceding the Bill of Rights. 85
Further, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (“Rule”) indicates that the
United States recognizes that children possess privacy interests in the context of the
internet.86 Section 6502 of the Rule requires that operators of websites or online
services must provide adequate notice of what information is collected from children
under the age of thirteen and disclose what that information is used for.87
Additionally, the Rule requires that operators of websites and online services receive
parental consent before collecting, using, or disclosing personal information received
from children.88 While the Rule suggests that children have a recognized privacy
interest, it is important to note that the Rule assumes a unified interest between
parents and children in relation to the children’s online privacy and security.89
Parental rights are generally held out among the oldest and most fundamental
rights in the United States.90 Coupled with the First Amendment’s guarantee of free
speech, parental rights seem to be an almost impenetrable legal force for children to

80. Id. at 166.
81. Id. at 170.
82. 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
83. Id. at 647.
84. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). In Griswold, the Court struck
down a law that forbid the use of prescribed drugs or medical devices for the purpose of
preventing contraception. Id. at 485. The Court found the very concept of searching a married
couple’s bedroom for signs of the use of contraception to be “repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.” Id. at 485–86.
85. Id. at 486.
86. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2012).
87. Id. § 6502.
88. Id.
89. Shmueli & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 9, at 783.
90. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
214 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
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overcome.91 Yet, neither parental rights nor the First Amendment are absolute92 and
children are not limited solely to the rights their parents can offer them.93 Further,
children possess privacy interests in the context of the internet,94 which suggests that
a balanced-rights approach to protecting children’s online privacy and parents’ right
to freely express views on parenting could be implemented in the United States.95
III. THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
The right to be forgotten is defined as “the right of an individual to erase, limit,
or alter past records that can be misleading, redundant, anachronistic, embarrassing,
or contain irrelevant data associated with the person, likely by name, so that those
past records do not continue to impede present perceptions of that individual.”96 This
right—announced in the European Court of Justice’s decision in Google Spain v.
Costeja97 and codified in the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
as the right to erasure98—recognizes the power struggle between the right to privacy
and freedom of expression99 and offers to balance the data subject’s right to privacy
against a search-engine user’s right to access information, which is derived from the
original poster’s freedom of speech.100 The right to be forgotten framework could
alleviate the tension between parents’ rights and children’s privacy interests in the
context of sharenting, as it balances the competing privacy interests of children and
their parents’ right to disseminate information about their children on social
networking sites.
The European Court of Justice’s landmark ruling in Google Spain v. Costeja
formally recognized the right to be forgotten for European citizens.101 In Google
Spain, the complainant—a Spanish national—lodged a complaint against Google
Spain, Google Inc., and a Spanish daily newspaper, La Vanguardia, arguing that two
pages mentioning his name and a “real-estate auction connected with attachment
proceedings for the recovery of social security debts” were no longer relevant.102
Further, he reasoned that Google Spain or Google Inc. should be required to remove
or conceal his personal data, cease to include the links in search results, and remove
his personal data in the links to La Vanguardia’s website, as the proceedings (which

91. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
92. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
93. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647–48 (1979).
94. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2012).
95. But see Michael J. Kelly & David Satola, The Right to Be Forgotten, 2017 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 40, 45 (2017) (arguing that due to the right to privacy’s limited textual legitimacy, the
explicit First Amendment right to free speech would likely prevail over competing privacy
rights).
96. Id. at 3.
97. Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD),
2014 E.C.R 317.
98. Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119).
99. Frosio, supra note 15, at 311–12.
100. Kelly & Satola, supra note 95, at 10, 39.
101. Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. ¶¶ 88–99.
102. Id. ¶¶ 14–15.
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occurred over fifteen years prior to the case) were now irrelevant.103 The Court of
Justice found that, due to the passage of time, accurate data may become inadequate,
irrelevant, or excessive and interfere with the data subject’s right to privacy.104 Given
this, the Court of Justice found that a data subject may request that information be
made unavailable to the public through a search of the subject’s name on a search
engine.105 The right to be forgotten is codified in the European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation under Article 17 as the right to erasure.106 Under Article 17,
data subjects have the right to request that data controllers erase personal data given
that the data is no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which it was
collected, and the controller has the obligation to erase the personal data.107
The General Data Protection Regulation specifically seeks to bolster the rights of
children in relation to online and data privacy. The United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (“Convention”) recognizes that children, due to their physical
and mental immaturity, “need[] special safeguards and care, including appropriate
legal protection . . . .”108 Further, Article 16 of the Convention recognizes children’s
freedom from unlawful or arbitrary interferences with their privacy and prohibits
unlawful attacks on their honor and reputation.109 However, some scholars question
the Convention’s effectiveness in protecting children and their rights in the context
of online privacy and dataveillance.110 The General Data Protection Regulation
(“Regulation”) expands upon the rights outlined in the Convention by explicitly
acknowledging (European) children’s rights in the context of data security:
Children merit specific protection with regard to their personal data, as
they may be less aware of the risks, consequences and safeguards
concerned and their rights in relation to the processing of personal data.
. . . The consent of the holder of parental responsibility should not be
necessary in the context of preventive or counselling services offered
directly to a child.111
Article 17 is generally viewed as the most prominent empowering right for
children in the Regulation, as it allows children to directly request the removal of
personal data from search engine results that could be damaging to their reputation.112
Further, the right to be forgotten recognizes that the passage of time can minimize
the value of the disclosed information and allows for the competing privacy interests

103. Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
104. Id. ¶ 93.
105. Id. ¶¶ 97–99.
106. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 14.
107. Id. §§ 1, 1(a); see Simone van der Hof & Eva Lievens, The Importance of Privacy by
Design and Data Protection Impact Assessments in Strengthening Protection of Children’s
Personal Data Under the GDPR, 23 COMM. L. 33, 37–38 (2018).
108. Convention on the Rights of the Child, pmbl., Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
109. Id. at art. 16.
110. See Lupton & Williamson, supra note 44, at 791.
111. Commission Regulation 2016/679, recital 38, 2016 O.J. (L 119); see also Macenaite,
supra note 39, at 766.
112. See Macenaite, supra note 39, at 769–70.
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of the child to be effectuated.113 Article 8 of the Regulation defines a child as an
individual below the age of sixteen but allows member states to provide a law for a
lower age so long as the age is not below thirteen.114 However, individuals can still
exercise the right to be forgotten once the individual reaches the age of majority.115
Despite concerns about the implementation of the right to be forgotten in the
United States, the right to be forgotten framework would be an effective remedy to
solve the sharenting dilemma. The main critique of the Google Spain decision and
the General Data Protection Regulation revolves around the shift in regulatory
responsibility from the government to corporate actors, which could suppress free
speech.116 However, Article 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation limits data
controllers’ obligation to erase personal data to the extent that processing personal
information is necessary for exercising the right of freedom of expression and
information.117 Further, while the power shift from judicial authorities to
private/corporate parties may be problematic, the necessary criteria and principles
needed for a balanced-rights implementation of the right to be forgotten have been
defined in detail by European regulatory and judicial institutions.118
After the Google Spain decision, Google formed an advisory council comprised
of academic scholars, media producers, data protection authorities, members of civil
society, and technologists to establish criteria for the removal of links.119 Google also
issued a transparency report,120 which indicates a limited chilling effect on free
speech and information.121 However, Google’s transparency report indicates that
minors, who make up just over five percent of data removal requestors, experience a
delisting rate that is nearly twice as high as private nonminors.122 According to
Google, common scenarios for delisting include: clear absence of public interest,

113. Steinberg, supra note 5, at 876.
114. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 14, at art. 8, § 1.
115. Macenaite, supra note 39, at 770.
116. Kelly & Satola, supra note 95, at 15; see also Steven M. LoCascio, Forcing Europe
to Wear the Rose-Colored Google Glass: The “Right to Be Forgotten” and the Struggle to
Manage Compliance Post Google Spain, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 296, 327 (2015)
(arguing that financial incentives could lead search engines to approve deletion requests);
Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 90–92 (2012) (arguing
that heavy fines could lead data controllers to opt for deletion in ambiguous cases, which could
produce a chilling effect on speech).
117. Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, § 3(a), 2016 O.J. (L 119); Frosio, supra
note 15, at 317.
118. Frosio, supra note 17, at 324.
119. Theo Bertram et al., Three Years of the Right to Be Forgotten, ELIE 2 (Feb. 2017),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/13f5/e3cd0e8e522238f5df2ce279e6188664165e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22UP-AUMR] (defining delisting as the removal of certain URLs from
appearing in search results linked to a particular individual’s name).
120. Id.
121. Requests to Delist Content Under European Privacy Law, GOOGLE: TRANSPARENCY
REP. [hereinafter Transparency Report], https://transparencyreport.google.com/euprivacy/overview [https://perma.cc/Q5AX-NV5F] (indicating that only 46% of erasure
requests which had been reviewed as of January 12, 2020 resulted in URLs being delisted);
see Frosio, supra note 15, at 325.
122. Bertram et al., supra note 119, at 7.
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sensitive information (including information about someone’s sexual orientation,
race, ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, or trade-union status), and content
relating to minors or to minor crimes that occurred when requestor was a minor.123
Furthermore, the right to be forgotten has a limited impact on the right to free speech,
as the right only impacts results obtained from searches (on search engines) made
based on a person’s name, and the original content always remains accessible from
individual websites or social media pages.124
Notably, the American public appears to be receptive to the implementation of
the right to be forgotten framework, at least for children. Based on a 2014 survey of
U.S. adults, 61% of those surveyed believe that some form of the right to be forgotten
(ability to remove “irrelevant” information) should be implemented in the United
States.125 Of the 61%, 15% believe that only minors should be afforded the right to
be forgotten.126 For 21% of Americans surveyed, the biggest concern in
implementing the right to be forgotten is the fact that the definition of “relevancy” is
too vague.127 This indicates that U.S. citizens are aware that personal information
found on the internet can be potentially harmful to children and adults and are open
to the right to be forgotten.128 Indeed, some states are beginning to pass legislation
that reflects the European Union’s right to be forgotten framework in the context of
children.129 In 2013, California passed a data privacy law that requires the operator
of websites, online services, and mobile applications which are used by minors to
permit minors, who are registered users of the online service, to remove content that
the user published on the site.130 The operator is also required to provide clear
instructions to a minor on how to remove or request the removal of content.131
However, California’s law is limited in the sense that it only requires the removal of
content posted by the registered minor users, and does not require the removal of
content posted by third parties, such as parents.132 Still, California’s data privacy law,
combined with studies suggesting U.S. citizens’ interest in adopting a right to be
forgotten, suggests that the implementation of a federal right to be forgotten law
would be met with popular support.133

123. European Privacy Requests Search Removals FAQs, GOOGLE: TRANSPARENCY REP.
HELP CTR., https://support.google.com/transparencyreport/answer/7347822 [https://perma.cc
/5EZ7-LZ6G].
124. Frosio, supra note 15, at 326–27.
125. Daniel Humphries, U.S. Attitudes Toward the ‘Right to Be Forgotten,’ SOFTWARE
ADVICE (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.softwareadvice.com/security/industryview/right-to-beforgotten-2014/ [https://perma.cc/C53G-RFSV].
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. See Robert Lee Bolton III, The Right to Be Forgotten: Forced Amnesia in a
Technological Age, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 133, 138–39 (2014).
130. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22581(a)(1)–(2) (2014); see Hall, supra note 5, at 134;
James Steyer, Oops! Button Lets Kids Remove Posts They Regret, CNN (Sept. 26, 2013, 10:44
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/opinion/steyer-california-eraser-button-law/
[https://perma.cc/U84A-MYAR].
131. BUS. & PROF. § 22581(a)(3).
132. Id. § 22581(b)(2).
133. But see Bolton, supra note 129, at 140–42 (discussing Europe and the United States’
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The right to be forgotten could be implemented in one of two fundamental ways
in the United States. First, the United States could simply adopt the European
Union’s right to be forgotten framework (as is) by assigning search engines the task
of evaluating removal requests and by allowing minors (and adults) to directly
petition the search engines to remove links to irrelevant data by submitting an online
form.134 As previously noted, some U.S. privacy and media scholars express concern
about placing the burden of evaluating data removal requests solely on search
engines and social media providers.135 These scholars argue that the search engines
could be overly influenced by the financial ramifications of failing to comply with
the regulation and would err on the side of caution by removing too much data in
ambiguous cases, which could lead to unwarranted suppression of otherwise free
speech.136 However, Google’s transparency report suggests that this concern might
be somewhat unfounded, as the search engine has removed data links in less than
fifty percent of data removal requests.137
Alternatively, the right to be forgotten could be enforced by the court system or
an administrative body specifically established to process data removal requests.138
As neutral arbiters, the courts would implement the right to be forgotten in a uniform
and transparent manner by consistently applying rules of procedure in such cases. 139
Further, the judiciary possesses specific expertise in applying legal definitions and
would eliminate some of the burden from search engines.140 However, by tasking the
judiciary with evaluating data removal requests, the federal court system would
likely be overwhelmed by an influx of removal requests,141 with Google alone
receiving well over 800,000 delisting requests since May 29, 2014.142 The
establishment of an administrative agency specifically designed to process delisting
requests would allow for a more unbiased and uniform approach to evaluating such
requests, while also limiting the burden on the court system.143 Yet, by implementing
a right to be forgotten framework that relies on judicial or administrative decision
making, children would be less successful in bringing delisting claims against search
engines. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, minors are only capable of
bringing legal claims if they are represented by a general guardian, committee,
conservator, or a like fiduciary; or by suing through a next friend or guardian ad
litem.144 Due to the general assumption that parents have their children’s best interest
in mind, children are often forced to rely on their parents to bring legal claims on

contrasting legal ideals).
134. See generally Macenaite, supra note 39, at 769–70.
135. See LoCascio, supra note 116 at 326–29; Rosen, supra note 116, at 90–92.
136. See LoCascio, supra note 116, at 327; Rosen, supra note 116, at 90–91.
137. Transparency Report, supra note 121.
138. See LoCascio, supra note 116, at 327.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 327–28. However, it is worth noting that search engines would still require
legal representation in data removal suits, which would be both costly and time-consuming.
141. See id. at 328.
142. Transparency Report, supra note 121 (as of January 2020).
143. See LoCascio, supra note 116 at 328–29.
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
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their behalf.145 In the context of sharenting, parents are unlikely to bring a suit on
behalf of their children for the removal of content that the parents themselves
posted.146 Therefore, the courts would be required to appoint guardian ad litems for
children to bring data removal claims,147 which would be both costly and timeconsuming for the courts.
CONCLUSION
The European Union’s right to be forgotten framework should be implemented in
the United States as a means of alleviating the tension between parental rights and
children’s privacy interest. The right to be forgotten offers a successful balancedrights approach, as parents still have the ability to freely express information about
their children and families on the internet, and children have the ability to remove
search links to that content from search engine results.148 While the right to be
forgotten does not protect children from many of the immediate harms associated
with sharenting (such as the disclosure of embarrassing or private information to
friends and family on Facebook) nor does it completely remove that content from
websites and social media sites, it does help eliminate some of its long-term harms.149
Although the right to be forgotten is an important means of privacy protection for
children, it should be a last resort for children to eliminate some of the long-term
damages that parental oversharing can cause. To eliminate many of the immediate
harms associated with sharenting and improve parent-child relationships, parents
must be made aware of privacy risks and seek out ways to protect their children’s
privacy in the online setting.150 Further, parents of teens and adolescents should be
cognizant of their children’s developing autonomy and seek out their opinion before
sharing personal information about them online.151 Still, the right to be forgotten is
an essential backend right afforded to children whose parents overshare on the
internet and should be implemented as federal law in the United States.

145. See Keith & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 413.
146. If parents were willing to bring such a claim on their children’s behalf, they would
probably agree to simply delete the data from their social media page and avoid the
unnecessary litigation.
147. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(2).
148. See Steinberg, supra note 5, at 876–77.
149. See Lupton & Williamson, supra note 44.
150. See Steinberg, supra note 5, at 879–82 (discussing ways in which parents can better
protect their children’s online privacy and promote children’s well-being and sense of
autonomy).
151. See Chalklen & Anderson, supra note 17, at 7.

